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Title VII Does Not Preempt State
Regulation of Private Club
Employment Practices
By DAVID A. GARCIA A.*
In an attempt to assuage critics concerned that the Civil Rights Act
of 19641 might force integration of those few "'public" accommodations
that were in fact enclaves of private association, 2 and might terminate
state prerogatives in proscribing discriminatory employment practices,
3
the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey4 remarked: "I wish to make it
clear that I do not believe there should be a Federal law which provides
that a private club should be managed this way, or managed that way
.... ,,5 Senator Humphrey subsequently asserted: "As I have stated
* . . title VII specifically provides for the continued effectiveness of
State laws and procedures for dealing with discrimination in employ-
ment. Where State remedies are available, an aggrieved person would
always be free to take advantage of them."16 Had Senator Humphrey
made these statements together, he might have prevented the current
battle7 over whether Congress' exclusion of private clubs from the am-
* Judge, Municipal Court, City and County of San Francisco; Former Associate Pro-
fessor, University of San Francisco School of Law; Former Executive and Legal Affairs
Secretary, California Fair Employment and Housing Commission. B.A., 1967; J.D., 1970,
University of San Francisco; L.L.M., 1971, Yale University.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a
to 2000h-6 (1976)). The 1964 Act was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
2. Title II of the 1964 Act prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on the
basis of race, color, religion, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1976).
3. Title VII of the 1964 Act prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin. Id. § 2000e-2.
4. Senator Humphrey served as floor manager for the 1964 Act.
5. 110 CONG. REC. 6008 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
6. Id. at 6550.
7. Since the statute does not expressly address whether title VII's exemption acts to
shield private clubs from state employment laws, it is anticipated that this issue will be
litigated in states attempting to regulate discrimination in private club employment prac-
tices. The case of Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, No. 119026
(Sonoma County Super. Ct., tentative decision filed Mar. 25, 1983), exemplifies the current
controversy concerning this issue. This superior court action was filed by the Bohemian
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bit of title V118 preempts regulation of these clubs as employers under
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Since Con-
gress failed to expressly provide this in the statute, we must draw con-
clusions based on inferences from remarks like those of Senator
Humphrey, from the decisions regarding the interrelationship of the
1964 Act with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 9 and, most importantly,
from the plain language of title VII itself.
This Article addresses the narrow question' ° of whether states are
precluded under the supremacy clause from including bona fide private
membership clubs as "employers" under the states' fair employment
practices laws (FEP laws)." It is the position of this Article that the
Club to seek review of a decision by California's Fair Employment and Housing Commis-
sion, DFEH v. Bohemian Club, FEHC Dec. No. 81-19 (1981), finding that title VII does not
preempt California's regulation of the employment practices of private clubs, and that the
all-male Bohemian Club's practice of hiring only men violated the state's antidiscrimination
laws.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
9. Id. §§ 1981, 1982. Section 1981 provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right. . . to make and enforce contracts ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens .... " Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." The Supreme
Court in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), held that § 1981
affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race.
Id. at 459-60.
10. This Article does not address the question of whether a state strategy of targeting
private clubs for civil rights enforcement is advisable, or the question of whether such ac-
tions could withstand alternative constitutional challenges. For example, an argument could
be made that a state's regulation of private clubs' employment practices constitutes an un-
constitutional abridgment of the club members' associational rights. The argument would
presuppose a factual situation in which employees are essential to a club's continued opera-
tion and the employees' duties require them to commingle with members during associa-
tional activities, and it would be premised on dictum by the Supreme Court that:
The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all
brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jew-
ish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell a man or
woman who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he
desires.
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974) (citation omitted). It is, however,
very doubtful whether associational rights are implicated in employer-employee relation-
ships. See, e.g., Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
where the court held:
[Elven if the Cravath partnership did enjoy First-Amendment protections, the ap-
plication of title VII to the process whereby Cravath promotes its employees to
partner would not infringe the partnership's First Amendment rights. Application
of the title VII to this case does not prevent the partners from associating for polit-
ical, social and economic goals.
Id. at 129 (citations omitted).
11. The following states do not exempt private clubs from their FEP laws of general
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explicit preemption provision contained in title XI of the 1964 Act ex-
pressly excuses no one from liability under state FEP laws. The deci-
sions by those courts that have read the private club exemptions of the
1964 Act into the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by implication are inapposite
and unpersuasive.
The 1964 Act's Exemption of Private Membership Clubs
Section 701(b)(2) of the 1964 Act excludes from the definition of
"employer" any bona fide private membership club exempt under the
Internal Revenue Code. 12 While a club's tax exempt status may be
readily established,'3 that status alone is insufficient to merit exemption
from the 1964 Act. To be exempt from title VII coverage under that
exception, the club must be both tax exempt and a bona fide private
membership club. 14 Indeed, to date the Supreme Court has found it
unnecessary to determine whether the private club exemptions in the
1964 Act must be read by implication into the Civil Rights Act of
186615 because it has never found that the charged entity was in fact a
"bona fide" private membership club.
16
application: California, CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983); Colo-
rado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401 to 24-34-406 (1973); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 46a-51 to 46a-99 (1977); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710-718 (1974); Florida,
FLA. STAT. §§ 23.161-23.167 (Supp. 1983); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 378-I to 378-9
(1976); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5901 to 67-5912 (1980); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68,
§§ 2-101 to 2-105 (Supp. 1983); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 601A.l-601A.19 (1975); Kentucky, Ky.
REv. STAT. §§ 344.010-344.990 (1983); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4571-4574
(1979); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2101-37.2804 (Supp. 1983); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. §§ 363.01-363.14 (Supp. 1983); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 296.010-296.070 (Supp.
1983); New Jersey, NJ. REV. STAT. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-28 (1976); New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to 28-1-14 (1978); New York, N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982);
Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-4112.99 (Page 1980); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 659.010-659.990 (1980); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-5-1 to 28-5-39 (1979); South
Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-13-1 to 20-13-56 (1979); Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-21-101 to 41-21-124 (1982); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495-496 (1978);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.010-49.60.320 (1974); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT.
§§ 111.31-111.395 (1974); and Wyoming, WYo. STAT. §§ 27-9-101 to 27-9-108 (1977).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1976). See I.R.C. § 501(c) (1976).
13. A question may arise, however, as to whether a club is entitled to its tax exempt
status. See, e.g., Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 130 n.4 (5th Cir.
1980); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980) (district court held that "the fact that the Cork Club
has been exempted from the Federal Income tax by virute of the 'Social Club' exemption is
of little evidentiary value in this matter [because] this determination by the District Director
was not made in a contested proceeding. This court does not know what amount of fact
finding he did, nor what factors he considered.").
14. EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969) (recreation
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The Preemption Doctrine
The preemption principle is derived from the supremacy clause of
the federal Constitution, which declares that federal law shall be "the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding."'17 Given the myriad contexts in which the
Supreme Court has been obliged to interpret the supremacy clause, it is
not surprising that the Court has stated in a variety of ways the thresh-
old standard for determining whether the clause invests Congress with
exclusive authority over a subject matter. "Where, as here, the field
which Congress is said to have preempted has been traditionally occu-
pied by the States, . . . 'we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifestpurpose of Congress.' "18 Pre-
emption exists only when the nature of the federally regulated subject
matter implicitly requires preemption or when Congress explicitly
association showed "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" because it was "open to every
white person within the geographic area, there being no selective element other than race"):
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973) (recreation associa-
tion admitting all whites within three-quarter mile area indistinguishable from Sullivan); see
also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172-73 n.10 (1976) (the "private" schools' racial
admission policies "do not raise the issue of whether the 'private club or other [private]
establishment' exemption in § 201(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e).
operates to narrow § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866" because "[t]he pattern of exclusion is
. . . directly analagous to that at issue in Sullivan and Tillman" and because "Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which the 'private club' exemption is a part, does not by its
terms reach private schools").
Several lower courts have reached the same result. See, e.g., Wright v. Salisbury Club.
Ltd., 632 F.2d 309, 312-13 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Sullivan, Tillman, and McCrary, court held
that the club is not exempted under the 1964 Act because it "does not follow a selective
membership policy," "has actively solicited members through public advertising," and "has
served the commercial interests of the developer of the Salisbury subdivision") Quijano v.
University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 133 (5th Cir. 1980) (credit unions "exist for
purely mercantile purposes," and "[1like 'auto clubs' credit unions are not clubs in any sense
of the word"); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co., 523 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(insurance association is for "personal benefit" of members and "does [not) impose mean-
ingful conditions of limited membership"). For criteria in determining bona fide private
membership club status under the 1964 Act, see Note, The Private Club Exemption To The
Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study In Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1112 (1969).
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
18. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Eleva-
tor Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (emphasis added). The Rice Court held that Illinois law,
which provided a more comprehensive scheme for the regulation of warehouses and ware-
house workers than that prescribed by the United States Warehouse Act, was preempted
under the federal act's explicit preemption provision that dictated that federal "power. juris-
diction and authority shall be exclusive with respect to all persons .... '" 331 U.S. at 233.
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preempts the area by specific leglislation.' 9 Federal supremacy is not
easily presumed without some clear manifestation of that intention by
Congress.
20
The proper frame of reference for the present discussion is the
Court's invariable recognition that the states possess broad authority
under their police powers in the area of employment practices, and that
state laws on that subject are not easily preempted.2' However, to un-
derstand the Supreme Court's analysis of the 1964 Act's exemption for
private clubs as it relates to state FEP laws that define "employer" to
include such clubs, one must proceed with caution. At least one com-
mentator expressed the concern that preemption decisions of the
Supreme Court display "an ad hoc, unprincipled quality, seemingly be-
reft of any consistent doctrinal basis."22 In fairness to the Court, how-
19. "Federal regulation . . .should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory
power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject
matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained."
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). In Florida Lime the
Court held, inter alia, that a state consumer protection measure that prescribed minimum oil
content as the criterion for importation of avocados, a criterion rejected by federal authori-
ties in favor of the criteria of date, size, and weight for regulating avocado marketing under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, was not inconsistent with the latter Act's stated purpose to
establish and maintain "such minimum standards of quality and maturity. . . as will effec-
tuate. . . orderly marketing .. " Id. at 147-48.
20. "'It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exer-
cise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The
exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.'" New York Dep't of Social
Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03
(1952)). The Dublino Court held that the Social Security Act "allows for complementary
state work incentive programs and procedures incident thereto--even if they become condi-
tions for continued assistance" under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Pro-
gram. Id. at 422.
21. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976).
22. Comment, The 1967 Age Discrimination In Employment Act And Preemption.- A
Casefor Broader State Laws, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 283, 290 n.45 (1978). See, e.g., Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S.
210 (1981), a case in which the Court held that federal law providing for military non-
disability retirement benefits preempts application of community property laws:
For all its purported reliance on Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, the Court fails either to
quote or cite the test for preemption which Hisquierdo established. In that case the
Court began its analysis, after noting that States "lay on the guiding hand" in
marriage law questions, by stating: "On the rare occasion where state family law
has come into conffict with the federal statute, this Court has limited review under
the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has 'positively re-
quired by direct enactment' that state law be preempted." The reason for the omis-
sion of this seemingly critical sentence from the Court's opinion today is of course
quite clear: the Court cannot, even to its satisfaction, plausibly maintain that Con-
gress has 'positively required by direct enactment' that California's community
property law be preempted by the provisions governing military retired pay.
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ever, it must be recognized that preemption questions as a whole are
not easily analyzed. The Court explained this difficulty in Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 23 in which it first set forth the criterion for determining
whether state law gives way to federal law, a criterion now firmly estab-
lished in the Court's decisions 24:
There is not-and from the very nature of the problem there cannot
be-any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pat-
tern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Congress.
The Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of
treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of
the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the
field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; viola-
tion; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions
provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitu-
tional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal
clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to deter-
mine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Penn-
sylvania's law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
25
In practice, laws protecting vital state interests have been preempted
only when preemption is expressly intended, and, in rare cases, when
some national policy is hindered.
26
Id. at 236-37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,
581 (1979)) (citations omitted).
23. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
24. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977). Jones itself provides an exam-
ple of the Court's enigmatic application of the preemption doctrine. There the Court ad-
dressed, inter alia, whether California's commodity net weight labeling law, which made no
allowance for loss of moisture in transit, was superceded by federal labeling requirements
that permitted such a variance. The Court noted that "California law apparently differs not
at all from federal law, as applied" with respect to overpackaging in that each authority's
practice was to disregard commodities that weighed more than the stated net weight, and
held that the state law was thus not preempted on that basis. Id. at 539. However, the Court
thereafter speculated that producers would overpackage to insure compliance with state law,
and incongruously held that the law would thus hinder the stated congressional purpose to
"facilitate value comparisons." Id. at 542. In decrying such a literal reading of the stated
congressional purpose, the minority understandably commented that "viewing such a pur-
pose to be sufficient to require preemption while the very purpose is ignored in practice by
the administering federal agency reverses the normal presumption against finding preemp-
tion." Id. at 547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (footnotes omitted). The Court in
Hines struck down as incompatible with a uniform immigration policy a Pennsylvania law
that imposed alien registration requirements beyond those mandated by the federal Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA). Cf. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (the
Court would "not presume that Congress, in enacting the INA, intended to oust state au-
thority to regulate the employment relationship covered by [the California Labor Code sec-
tion prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal aliens] in a manner consistent with
pertinent federal laws").
26. See Note, A Framework For Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 389 (1978).
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The Preemption Provision of the 1964 Act
When Congress has promulgated an explicit preemption provi-
sion, the standard set forth in Hines must be applied.27 The 1964 Act
contains a preemption provision, codified at section 1104 of title XI,
which reads:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in
which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the
same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed
as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is
inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision
thereof.2
8
Section 1104 answers in the negative the initial question of
whether Congress has assumed complete preeminence in the field of
discrimination law, and instead poses a two-tier test for determining
whether provisions of a particular state law are preempted by the 1964
Act: whether the state provisions are "inconsistent with any of the pur-
poses" of the federal enactment, or whether they are "inconsistent with
...any provision thereof."
With respect to the purposes of title VII, the Supreme Court has
Based on Congress' express and specific intent to preempt "any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan," the Supreme Court recently
held that "New York's Human Rights Law is preempted with respect to ERISA benefit
plans only insofar as it prohibits practices that are lawful under federal law." Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2906 (1983). Because New York's Human Rights Law for-
bids discrimination in employee benefit plans on the basis of pregnancy, and did so before
an equivalent amendment to title VII was enacted in 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981), its operation before the effective date of the title VII amendment was pre-
empted by ERISA. This result was mandated because ERISA provides, in addition to its
preemption clause, that "[niothing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify,
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)
(1976). In holding that state antidiscrimination laws are not saved by this clause of the
express preemption clause, the Shaw Court nonetheless recognized that state laws and their
administrative schemes play a significant role in the enforcement of title VII. The Court
further recognized that title VII does not prevent states from extending their antidiscrimina-
tion laws to areas not covered by title VII, stating: "Quite simply, title VII is neutral on the
subject of all employment practices it does not prohibit." 103 S. Ct. at 2903. Indeed, the
Court noted that "Title VII expressly preserves nonconflicting state laws in its § 708." Id.
27. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1977). See also Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 233 (1947). The Court has implicitly harmonized its employ-
ment of variously stated standards for determining whether the authority to legislate in a
given area is vested in Congress alone with its obligation to apply explicit preemption provi-
sions, by noting that such provisions are "presumably intended to do no more than recog-
nize explicitly an accommodation between federal and state interests to which Congress and
the decisions of this Court have consistently adhered." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144-45 n.13 (1963).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1976).
noted repeatedly that "Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ...to assure equality of employment opportunities by
eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 29 Enforcement of state
FEP laws against private clubs is consistent with that purpose. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in an analogous context, at
a time when title VII had been interpreted not to include pregnancy-
related disabilities within its proscription of sex discrimination,30 that
an interpretation of the state's antidiscrimination law requiring the in-
clusion of pregnancy-related disabilities in a comprehensive disability
plan would impose a higher duty than that existing under federal law,
but would not be inconsistent with the express purpose of title VII of
eliminating all practices which lead to inequality in employment
opportunity. 3
1
It may be accurate to state that by including a private club exemp-
tion similar to section 201(b) of title 1132 Congress made it possible for
those who wish to restrict their personal association to also determine
whom they will employ.3 3 It would, however, be incorrect to infer from
the mere presence of the section 701 exemption that there existed a
secondary congressional purpose to immunize clubs from all FEP
laws.34 In fact, the Supreme Court has held, in Savage v. Jones,3 5 that
preemption in areas not covered by the federal legislation is never in-
ferred from the mere fact that the regulation occupies only a limited
field.
36
29. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (citing McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-
30 (1971). Accord Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457 (1975).
30. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Gilbert has since been over-
turned by congressional enactment of § 701(k). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981).
31. Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375
Mass. 160, 167, 375 N.E. 2d 1192, 1195 (1978). Cf. New York Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dub-
lino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973) (the Court explained that "[ilt would be incongruous for
Congress on the one hand to promote work opportunities for AFDC recipients and on the
other to prevent States from undertaking supplementary efforts towards this very same end.
We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes.").
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1976) (the 1964 Act's public accommodations title).
33. Fesal v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 573, 577 (D.C. Del. 1977).
34. The Fesal court did not draw this inference; it merely sought to clarify the nature of
the § 701 exemption as a prelude to holding that a nursing home, though distinctly private,
was not a "membership club" under that section. Id. at 578.
35. 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
36. Id. at 533. Accord Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 13 (1937) (The Court found
that, "in relation to the inspection of the hull and machinery of respondents' tugs, the state
touches that which the federal laws and regulations have left untouched. There is plainly no
inconsistency with the federal provisions.").
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The task of evaluating whether Congress, in enacting title VII of
the 1964 Act, had a secondary purpose to exempt private clubs and
preempt state law regarding these employers, is simplified by the fact
that there is no legislative history discussing the purpose of this statu-
tory exemption.37 In the absence of strong legislative history to the
contrary, the plain purpose of the statute controls. 38 The only congres-
sional discussion of remote relevance involves title II's private club ex-
emption clause,39 which is unique to that title's proscription of
discriminatory admission policies in public accommodations. While it
can reasonably be argued that the legislative history evidences Con-
gress' concern about the constitutionality of proscribing discriminatory
membership policies by truly private clubs and its intent to avoid con-
stitutional infirmities in the 1964 Act,4° that purpose was accomplished
by the inclusion of the Act's exemption clauses, and cannot be hindered
by a state choosing to expose its own FEP law to constitutional
scrutiny.
In short, title VII "is neutral on the subject of all employment
practices it does not prohibit."41 Its purpose is not to protect associa-
tional rights and a limited exemption from title VII's proscriptions can-
not militate against its clear purpose-the elimination of discrimination
in employment. Absent an express, specific intent to preempt state laws
that proscribe private clubs' discriminatory employment practices, no
such preemption occurs. Had Congress intended this preemption, it
certainly could have chosen plainer language. It would be truly anom-
alous if the many exemptions from title VII's provisions were deemed
to be legislative purposes paramount to the primary articulated legisla-
tive purpose of eliminating discrimination in employment on the enu-
merated bases. Of course, the constitutional character of associational
rights and congressional concern for that character must be understood
in order to comprehend that the preservation of private clubs' associa-
tional rights is not a preeminent legislative purpose embodied in title
VII. That Congress, in light of the character of the right of association,
chose not to specifically preclude states' enactments is of some import.
Perhaps a better indication that it was not Congress' purpose in
enacting title VII to preempt state laws prohibiting private club em-
37. Fesal v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 428 F. Supp. at 577.
38. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 461 (D.D.C. 1972).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 70-126.
40. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1201 (D.
Conn. 1974) (noting congressional "doubts" about the constitutionality of a public accom-
modations title that did not include an exemption for bona fide private membership clubs).
41. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
ployment discrimination is the language of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).42 Enacted a scant three years after title VII,
the ADEA contains no provision exempting private clubs from dis-
criminating on the basis of age in their employment practices. If Con-
gress was so concerned with the sacrosanct right of association and the
effects that proscribing discriminatory employment practices would
have on this right, Congress surely would have exempted private clubs
from compliance with the ADEA. Certainly, in an age-conscious soci-
ety like ours, the right to associate with persons of one's age group is as
important as the right to associate with persons of one's own race, na-
tional origin, religion, or sex. Yet Congress exhibited no such concern
for private clubs in enacting the ADEA. This confluence of legislative
action does not necessarily speak as much of the growth of enlighten-
ment as it does of past legislative pragmatism. This confluence of legis-
lative action puts into perspective the private club exemption contained
in title VII and makes it clear that that exemption cannot be construed
or elevated to be a congressional purpose. It further clarifies that pri-
vate club associational rights are not, in the mind of Congress, para-
mount, constitutionally, to Congress' or the states' authority to regulate
the privilege of employment through antidiscrimination statutes.
In addition to preempting any state law that is inconsistent with
the purposes of the 1964 Act, section 1104 also invalidates state laws
that are inconsistent with any provision of the federal statute.43 "The
word 'inconsistent'. . . does not mean merely inharmonious or unsym-
metrical but connotes impossibility of concurrent operative effect."
44
Therefore, before title VII's exemption of private clubs can be found to
preempt state FEP law provisions that define employers to include such
clubs, a private club's compliance with the state's FEP law must result
in a violation of the 1964 Act. A state's imposition of discrimination-
free employment practices would not place private employers in a posi-
tion of having to violate title VII. State enforcement would, instead,
be additional to, and concurrent with, federal antidiscrimination
statutes.45
This interpretation is buttressed by the Supreme Court's instruc-
tion in Jones v. Rath Packing Co. 46 that the preemption issue requires
consideration of the relationship between state and federal laws as in-
42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1976).
44. In re Brown, 329 F. Supp. 422, 426 (S.D. Iowa 1971) (citations omitted).
45. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540 (1977).
46. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
May/July 1983] PRIVATE CLUB EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
terpreted and applied, not merely as written.47 In Jones, the Court re-
viewed a California labeling law that required overweighting of
packages, a result at variance with federal law as then written.48 In
validating the law the Court cited as determinative the fact that, despite
the literal language of the federal labeling law, in practice the federal
legislation, like its state counterpart, was not concerned with the
overweighting problem in the administration of federal weights and
measures laws.
49
Similarly, federal authorities have not evidenced concern about
the states' imposition of a broader liability on those employers ex-
empted under the 1964 Act. Indeed, it is the practice of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to refer complainants to
state agencies in the absence of title VII subject matter jurisdiction.50 It
would be highly incongruous for EEOC officers to refer cases over
which it lacks jurisdiction to states that claim subject mattter jurisdic-
tion if, in fact, title VII, the EEOC's enabling statute, preempts such
state adjudication.5 ' As in Jones, these instructions by the EEOC un-
dercut the argument that there is a federal interest in preventing a re-
sult under state law at variance with that obtained under the federal
law.5 2 Instead, the above analysis makes it clear that state FEP laws
that define "employers" to include private clubs are not preempted
under the 1964 Act's general preemption provision.
47. Id at 526 (citations omitted).
48. See supra note 24 & accompanying text.
49. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. at 539.
50. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §§ 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 2.1(c) & Exh. 1-B.
51. Compare Comment, supra note 22, where it is argued with reference to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) that:
[E]qually unsuccessful would be the argument that forced deference to state laws
which protect persons below forty from age discrimination hinders the ADEA's
primary purpose by diluting the federal government's emphasis on protecting the
older worker. With regard to preemption questions, the Supreme Court has stated
that "the contemporaneous construction, not only of the courts, but of the depart-
ments, and even of the officials whose duty it is to carry the law into effect, is
universally held controlling." Thus neither the Secretary of Labor nor the "offi-
cials whose duty it is to carry the law into effect" have voiced any concern for the
type of hindrance mentioned here. Indeed, federal compliance officers, who are
responsible for enforcing the ADEA on the state level, have stated that their agen-
cies actually refer citizens to the state or federal law which provides the most pro-
tection. Since the agency in charge of enforcing the ADEA defers to broader state
laws, the argument that such deference conflicts with the primary purpose of the
ADEA is, at best, weak.
Id at 309 (footnotes omitted).
52. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. at 539.
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The Saving Clause
The preceding discussion of the effect of title XI's section 1104 on
state FEP law inclusion of private clubs, although useful for purposes
of traditional preemption analysis, may be superfluous to a resolution
of this inquiry: the general language of a statute will not be held to
prevail over specific language in another part of the same statute.
53
Section 1104 applies to all of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which title
VII is only one part.54 More specifically, section 70855 of title VII reads
as follows:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by
any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a
State, other than any such law which purports to require or permit
the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment prac-
tice under this subchapter.
56
In drafting the 1964 Act, Congress chose to include this specific pre-
emption provision to underscore the independent relationship between
the state and federal jurisdictions in the field of employment practices.
This provision constitutes a saving clause to preserve intact state FEP
laws,57 and was intended to preempt only state "protective" laws such
as those that proscribe discriminatory treatment of working women.
58
States are free to prosecute private clubs that discriminate in their
employment practices because a contrary holding would contravene
Congress' cod/ifed intent that entities subject to state laws shall not be
53. In re Brown, 329 F. Supp. 422, 425 (S.D. Iowa 1971) (citations omitted). "Section
227 specifically repeals 18 U.S.C., Section 2514 four years after the effective date of the Act.
This specific section must control over any implication of immediate repeal in the general
language of Section 259." Id at 426.
54. Jones Metal Prod. Co. v. Walker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 173, 176, 281 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1972).
55. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 1971).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1976). In citing this section, the Supreme Court has stated
that "Title VII expressly preserves nonconflicting state laws." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
103 S. Ct. 2890, 2902 (1983).
57. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 1971) (in-
validating sex-based weight-lifting limitations); Le Blanc v. Southern Bell, 333 F. Supp. 602,
609 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 990 (1972) (invali-
dating sex-based weekly hours limitations).
58. Le Blanc v. Southern Bell, 333 F. Supp. 602, 609 (E.D. La. 1971), affid, 460 F.2d
1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 990 (1972) ("We agree (that §§ 708 and 11041 were
intended to save those state laws which aimed at preventing employment discrimination
. ... ). See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co.. 444 F.2d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 1971) ("[§ 708]
was designed to preserve the effectiveness of state anti-discrimination laws"); 110 CONG.
REC. 6563 (1964) (comments of Sen. Kuchel) ("Title VII would not supersede nondiscrimi-
nation laws nor preempt any State authority in this area."); SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 678 (1976) ("Title VII does not supplant any state remedy:
indeed, § 708 expressly recognizes that State remedies are unaffected.").
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exempt from liability.59 Thus, even if a state's exercise of police power
would frustrate a federal purpose, when a national statute expressly
saves certain state laws the courts follow this command "even if it ap-
pears inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute and even if the
state law forbids the exercise of opportunities expressly granted by the
national law."'60 State requirement of discrimination-free employment
practices by private clubs need not be based on any "unlawful employ-
ment practice" under title VII.61 Indeed, this type of state regulation is
saved by express provisions in the federal statute.
The Case Law
No final court decision has yet issued on the question of whether a
state may proscribe discriminatory employment practices by private
clubs. 62 However, there does exist a line of cases63 involving the im-
59. Cf. Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1981), wherein the court held
that Alaska's Wage and Hour Act, which provided a higher minimum wage and a more
liberal schedule for overtime payments than the Fair Labor Standards Act, was not pre-
empted by the latter act. The employer had argued that one of the purposes of the federal
act was to avoid duplicative litigation and that an employee should thus be precluded from
instituting a private suit under state law once federal authorities had commenced an action
against the employer. The court held that "[a]lthough it is certainly true that Congress in-
tended to limit duplicative federal litigation, it does not follow that maintenance of a state
action would frustrate that purpose," id. at 903-04, and went on to note:
[I]f the Secretary's suit terminated private state suits, it would prevent employees
from recovering the additional increment of wages which they are entitled to under
the state law, thereby frustrating Congress' clear intent established in § 218(a) that
no provision of this chapter. . . shall excuse noncompliance with. . . any State
law providing for such additional recovery.
Id. at 904.
60. Note, supra note 26, at 366 (footnote omitted). Cf. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1963) (The Court cited the saving clause of the National
Labor Relations Act and held that, despite the fact that the NLRA's express purpose was to
foster collective bargaining, and "even if the union-security agreement clears all federal hur-
dles, the States by reason of § 14(b) have the final say and may outlaw it. There is thus
conflict between state and federal law; but it is a conflict sanctioned by Congress with direc-
tions to give the right of way to state laws barring the execution and enforcement of union-
security agreements."); Webster v. Bechtel, Inc., 621 P.2d 890, 900 (Alaska 1981) (the court
noted that "a saving clause may prevent preemption of state statutes which conflict with the
purpose of a federal statute").
61. Cf. Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 375
Mass. 160, 167, 375 N.E.2d 1192, 1198 (1978) (The court reasoned that "Gilbert interpreted
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) as not requiring the inclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities in a
disability plan; Gilbert did not hold that the inclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities vio-
lated Title VII. Hence, an interpretation of [the state's antidiscrimination law] which re-
quired the inclusion of such disabilities in a comprehensive disability plan would not require
• ..the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under [Title
VII].").
62. In DFEH v. Bohemian Club, FEHC Dec. No. 81-19 (1981), the California Fair
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plied repeal of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to the degree that it regu-
lates the activities of private clubs exempt under the 1964 Act. 64 The
ultimate issue in these cases was whether Congress' inclusion of the
private club exemptions in the 1964 Act mandates non-recognition of
alternative causes of action against such entities under other federal
antidiscrimination law. Although these cases are relevant to the instant
discussion, they are inapposite to the issue of title VII's possible pre-
emptive effect on state legislation.
The fundamental distinction between the implied repeal cases and
the preemption issue at hand is that the former involves an intra-fed-
eral squabble while the latter involves principles of federalism. 65 In-
deed, the issue of whether the 1964 Act affects the 1866 Act cannot
Employment and Housing Commission ruled that title VII does not preempt California's
regulation of the employment practices of private clubs, and that the all-male Bohemian
Club's practice of employing only men violated the state's antidiscrimination employment
laws. See supra note 7.
As of the date of publication of the Article the final decision on the appeal of this case
to the Superior Court has not yet been issued. However, the tentative decision of the supe-
rior court indicates that a preemptory writ of mandamus shall be issued to compel the Com-
mission to vacate its order. Bohemian Club v. FEHC, No. 119026 (Sonoma County Super.
Ct., tentative decision filed Mar. 25, 1983). One reason for the court's tentative decision to
order respondent to set aside its decision is that the FEHC had proceeded without jurisdic-
tion because application of the state law to a bona fide private club "is inconsistent with, and
superseded by federal law." Id. at 3.
Evidently the superior court has reached the tentative conclusion that the exemption
from title VII contained in § 701(b) preempted the state's regulation of private club employ-
ment practices. It would appear that the superior court was persuaded by the argument that
application of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) to the Bohemian
Club would be inconsistent with the congressional purpose of exempting private clubs from
title VII. This implies that the court found the general preemption provision, § 1104, to
control title VII's saving clause, § 708. The tentative decision of the superior court contains
no analysis of this issue. It is integral to this Article's thesis that the superior court has
tentatively erred. See supra notes 27-61 & accompanying text.
63. Hereinafter referred to as the "implied repeal cases."
64. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211, 1214 (4th
Cir. 1971) (holding that the 1964 Act's explicit private club exemption must be read by
implication into § 1981 and thus a black person could not obtain membership in a private
club under the 1866 Act), rev'd, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club,
Inc., 535 F. Supp. 313, 317 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (holding that the private club "exemption in
Title VII supercedes and limits § 1981 so as to bar the employment discrimination suit under
§ 1981" by a black complainant who alleged that his termination as a maintenance worker
was racially motivated); Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (holding
that "private membership clubs are impliedly exempted from the provisions of § 1981 by
virtue of the explicit, conflicting and therefore superseding exception of Title VII" and thus
the white complainant who alleged that his termination as a security guard was racially
motivated could not state a cause of action under the 1866 Act); Cornelius v. Benevolent
Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1201 (D. Conn. 1974) (same as Tillman).
65. For a cogent argument for judicial restraint in the latter circumstances, see Frank-
furter, Some Reections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 539-40 (1947).
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raise a supremacy clause question because both were passed by the fed-
eral legislature. Furthermore, while apparently all courts are in agree-
ment that the Congress which drafted the 1964 Act did so without
consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,66 it is also established
that Congress' decision in the 1964 legislation to expressly promote co-
operation with the states came as a result of growing resistance to fed-
eral power in areas traditionally occupied by the states.67 Indeed, in
light of Congress' substantial deference to states' rights legislation as
revealed in numerous title VII provisions,68 a plausible secondary pur-
pose of Congress in enacting the 1964 Act was to avoid unwarranted
federal instrusion into an area that historically has been the states' do-
main. The courts in the implied repeal cases did not address this piv-
otal concern. Nor did they reconcile their analyses with title VII's
saving clause which, by its terms, is directed only to the survivability of
state FEP laws and is Congress' definitive word on that subject.
69
While the implied repeal cases are unhelpful to a proper determi-
nation of the preemption issue, they are also unpersuasive in their own
right. Moreover, they employ misleading analyses that obfuscate pri-
vate club employers' perceptions as to their responsibilities for provid-
66. See cases cited supra note 64.
67. Comment, supra note 22, at 302.
68. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(l) (mandates federal cooperation with state agen-
cies); 2000e-5(c) (prohibits federal action prior to sixty days after state proceedings have
commenced); 2000e-5(d) (requires the EEOC to notify state authorities as to any charge
made within the state's jurisdiction and to refrain from proceeding on the charge for a pe-
riod of sixty days if requested to do so); 2000e-8(b) (authorizes written agreements between
the EEOC and its state counterparts which may include provisions restricting federal au-
thority to proceed in any case or class of cases and against any person or class of persons);
2000e-8(d) (dictates consultation and coordination of reporting requirements with state
agencies, and provides for federally-secured employment information to be furnished to a
state at its request) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 42-52. The 1964 Act's public accommodations
title contains a saving clause that addresses the survivability of both federal and state laws
with respect to matters covered under that title. Section 207(b) of title II states:
The remedies provided in this subchapter shall be the exclusive means of enforcing
the rights based on this subchapter, but nothing in this subchapter shall preclude
any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any
other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this subchapter, including any
statute or ordinance requiring nondiscrimination in public establishments or ac-
commodations, or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be
available for the vindication or enforcement of such right.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b) (1976). Only the court in Cornelius x Benevolent Protective Order of
Elks mentioned this provision in reading by implication title II's private club exemption
into the 1866 Act. In its sole equivocal reference to the clause the court opined that it "does
not preclude but rather provides for the possibility of a limitation of earlier legislation." 382
F. Supp. 1182, 1202 (D. Conn. 1974).
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ing discrmination-free employment under state laws and under section
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
In only two cases, Kemerer v. Davis70 and Hudson v. Charlotte
Country Club,7' have courts held explicitly that title VII's private club
exemption must be read by implication into section 1981, precluding
employment discrimination suits against private clubs under the 1866
Act. These courts have so held without the benefit of any legislative
history to support that conclusion. 72 Instead, the courts have chosen to
rely on lower court decisions, such as Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective
Order of Elks,73 and decisions reversed on appeal, such as Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association 74 and Wright v. Salisbury Club,
Ltd 75 In these latter cases, complainants sought membership in pri-
vate clubs. The courts held only that the private club exemption clause
of the 1964 Act's public accommodations title76 must, by implication,
be read into the 1866 Act. The clear difference between the member-
ship practices at issue in Cornelius, Tillman, and Wright, and the em-
ployment practices at issue in Kemerer and Hudson is a critical one.
Indeed, the Cornelius court recognized this fact in its analysis of the
nature of club membership:
[I]f the term "social rights" has any meaning, it would appear to ap-
ply here. Cornelius' interest in joining the private club of his choice
surely does not consitute a basic right of citizenship. We recognize,
of course, that "social rights" and "civil rights" are but extremes on
the broad spectrum of the "social contract."1
77
Whatever may be the status of one's "right" to obtain membership in a
private club, one's right to discrmination-free employment opportunit-
ites is civil in nature, and the opportunity to enforce such a right under
the 1866 Act should not be thoughtlessly eschewed under the rubric of
a "social rights" analysis.
The Supreme Court's reasoning inRunyon v. McCrary7s is particu-
larly apposite in exposing the salient difference between the nature of
70. 520 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
71. 535 F. Supp. 313, 317 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
73. 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974).
74. 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971), rey'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
75. 479 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.
1980).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1976).
77. Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. at 1199. Cf. Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 294-95 n.14 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[T]here are two
kinds of relations of men, those that are controlled by the law and those that are controlled
by personal choice. The former involves civil rights, the latter social rights.").
78. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
1122 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
May/July 1983] PRIVATE CLUB EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
title II's subject matter and that of title VII. The Runyon Court con-
fronted a factual situation of private school discrimination in enroll-
ment practices. Like clubs that are characterized as "private" for most
purposes but should be treated as "public" for purposes of evaluating
their rights as employers, 79 the challenged schools were characterized
by the Court as "private" in the sense that they were not receiving pub-
lic funds, but "public" in the sense that they recruited all Caucasian
students who met the schools' facially neutral qualifications.80 The
Court held that
parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to edu-
cation institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is
desirable, and that the children have an equal right to attend such
institutions. But it does not follow that the practice of excluding ra-
cial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same
principle.
8 '
The Supreme Court thus recognized that a spectrum of rights ex-
ists on which a particular practice can be positioned, and the location
on the spectrum is determined by the practice itself. Thus, the location
of a private club's employment practice on the spectrum is not depen-
dent on the club's status for purposes of evaluating its membership
practices. The only case that could be made for implied repeal of sec-
tion 1981 is that Congress intended to shield private clubs from regula-
tion of their bona fide membership practices.82 It cannot fairly be said
that the failure of Congress to include private clubs within title VII's
definition of "employer"83 evidences an intent to have private clubs
immunized from other employment laws.
84
Closer examination of the rationale for finding that the private
club exemption of title II limits the scope of section 1981 demonstrates
the error in the Kemerer holding that title II's exemption applies with
79. As stated by Justice Douglas in his concurrence in Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
267 (1963), "there is hardly any private enterprise that does not feel the pinch of some public
regulation-from price control, to health and fire inspection, to zoning, to safety measures,
to minimum wages and working conditions, to unemployment insurance." Id. at 280-81.
80. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 n.10 (1976).
81. Id. at 176 (emphasis in original).
82. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1201-02
(D. Conn. 1974) ("Leading opponents of the Act argued that people have a constitutional
right to choose their associates. Supporters responded by arguing that 'where freedom of
association might logically come into play as in cases of private organizations, Title 11 quite
properly exempts bona fide private clubs .. ) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
84. The characterization is from Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382
F. Supp. 1182, 1200 (D. Conn. 1974) ("Congress has immunized [private club] discrimina-
tion with regard to membership from the coverage of [the 1964] Act.").
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equal force to section 1981.85 The Kemerer court cited Wright 86 for the
recognized rule of statutory construction that repeal by implication is
not favored. To support an implied repeal courts require that the two
provisions be in irreconcilable conflict and that the legislature intended
repeal.87 It cannot plausibly be argued that either requirement is met
here.
With respect to the purported "irreconcilable conflict" between ti-
tle VII and section 1981, the Kemerer court stated that if section 1981
were applied literally, it would reach within private establishments pro-
tected by the 1964 Act and the two statutes would then be in conflict.,
The Wright court, however, incorrectly used the word "protected" to
describe private clubs' relationship to the 1964 Act. 89 It has never been
suggested that the 1964 Act was intended to extend the rights of private
clubs beyond those found in the Constitution. As the Supreme Court
state in Norwood v. Harrison,9 while the Constitution does not pro-
scribe private bias, it does not protect discrimination.9'
85. Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
86. Id. (citing Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 378, 386 (E.D. Va. 1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 378, 386 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'don other
grounds, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980).
90. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
91. "Invidious private discimination may be characterized as a form of exercising free-
dom of association protected by the First Amendment, but has never been accorded affirma-
tive constitutional protections." Id. at 470. Accord Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176
(1976).
Indeed, a strong case can be made that a conclusion that Congress intentionally ex-
empted private clubs from coverage under the 1964 Act in order to secure for clubs an
unfettered right to discriminate in their membership and employment practices should result
in a holding that the 1964 Act as thus interpreted constitutes a denial of due process under
the fifth amendment. Principal support for this contention is the case of Mulkey v. Reitman,
64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), affid, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In Mulkey.
the California Supreme Court held that Proposition 14, which added to the state's constitu-
tion a right "to decline to sell, lease or rent [real] property to such person or persons as [one].
in his absolute discretion, chooses," violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because the electorate had "taken affirmative action of a legislative nature
designed to make possible private discriminatory practices which previously were legally
restricted." Id. at 541-42, 413 P.2d at 833-34, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90. The MulkeY court
addressed a situation in which the electorate fully intended to repeal the state's fair housing
law to permit invidious discrimination. This fact invites the argument that Mulkey is there-
fore inapposite to the Congress' passage of the 1964 Act's exemption provisions because,
unlike the California electorate, Congress had lofty constitutional considerations in mind
when it circumscribed the parameters of the 1964 Act to exclude private clubs. See supra
text accompanying note 40. Moreover, when Congress "enacted the 1964 legislation, it did
not and could not have known about the [availability of a private cause of action under] the
1866 Act [because] not until 1968, four years after the 1964 Act became law, did the
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Although the Hudson court did not directly confront the question
of whether there exists an "irreconcilable conflict" between title VII
and section 1981, it did implicitly address that requirement in reaching
its conclusion that if private clubs are exempt from employment dis-
crimination suits under title VII but subject to suit under section 1981
for the same offense, the exemption in title VII is meaningless. 92 That
assertion is incorrect. Title VII and section 1981 afford two distinct
remedies for victims of discrimination. 93 The chief handicap of com-
plainants who are precluded from seeking redress under title VII be-
cause the discriminating entity is not an "employer" within the
meaning of section 70194 is their inability to avail themselves of the
federal machinery that was installed to facilitate conciliation agree-
ments and thus obviate costly private action.95 This result can hardly
Supreme Court first determine that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited 'private' as well
as officially sanctioned discrimination." Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 378,
386 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980).
The argument is not persuasive. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Nor-
wood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), in holding that Mississippi may not loan books to
sectarian schools that discriminate on the basis of race:
[G]ood intentions as to one valid objective do not serve to negate the [govern-
ment's] involvement in violation of a constitutional duty. "The existence of a per-
missible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect." The
Equal Protection Clause would be a sterile promise if [government] involvement in
possible private activity could be shielded altogether from constitutional scrutiny
simply because its ultimate end was not discrimination but some higher goal.
Id. at 466-67 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Mulkey court grounded its decision on the
ultimate fact that the state had "lent its processes to the achievement of discrimination." 64
Cal. 2d at 537, 413 P.2d at 830-31, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87. The same must be said of the
Congress' decision to exclude private clubs from the reach of the 1964 Act if one concludes
that private clubs may violate state FEP laws because Congress evidenced an intention that
they be permitted to discriminate. Such a congressional "authorization" is, according to the
Mulkey court, for purposes of constitutional analysis, equivalent to governmental imposi-
tion of discriminatory practices. id. at 540-41, 413 P.2d at 832-32, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 888-89.
The proper perspective for viewing the 1964 Act's private club exemption provisions is
not that Congress has "elected to place its power . . . and prestige behind the admitted
discrimination," Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961), by preempt-
ing state prerogatives to proscribe discrimination by private clubs, but rather it is to recog-
nize that Congress is under no "obligation to take positive action in an area where it is not
otherwise committed to act," Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d at 537, 413 P.2d at 830-31, 50
Cal. Rptr. at 886-87, and that the 1964 Act, as thus interpreted, is constitutional.
92. Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 313, 317 (W.D.N.C 1982).
93. Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 504 n.7 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 458 (1975).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
95. Indeed, one may postulate that it was Congress' intent in exempting private clubs
from the ambit of title VII to merely preclude the use of federal resources in pursuit of a
class of employers which, it can be argued, should be secondary game in the hunt for viola-
tors of civil rights. Such a purpose, of course, is unaffected by divergent state practices.
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be described as "meaningless" and certainly cannot be characterized as
"of no practical effect." 96
The result in Long v. Ford Motor Co. 97 supports this conclusion.
The Long court had before it a complainant who failed to meet the
EEOC requirement that a charge be filed with the EEOC within 210
days of the alleged violation.98 The court held that a plaintiff is not
required to pursue his title VII remedies before instituting an action
under section 1981.99 A complainant's circumvention of a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite for bringing a title VII suit does not render title
VII's procedural jurisdictional requirements of no practical effect. I°°
Therefore, it is unpersuasive to argue that a complainant who fails to
meet a substantive jurisdictional requirement and so proceeds under
section 1981 somehow debilitates the strictures of title VII. The Long
court concluded that title VII is not in irreconcilable conflict with sec-
tion 1981, and that "it does not cover the field in which section 1981
was sown."101
With respect to the second requirement for implied repeal-con-
gressional intent to have such an effect 02-the Kemerer and Hudson
courts again rely on the title II cases, 0 3 and specifically on language in
Wright:
When Congress enacted the 1964 legislation, it did not and could not
have known about the conflict with the 1866 Act. Indeed, not until
1968, four years after the 1964 Act became law, did the Supreme
Court first determine that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited
'private' as well as officially sanctioned discrimination. 10 4
96. Compare Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), in which the Court highlighted
the federal machinery made available to housing complainants under the newly enacted
Open Housing Act and observed that "although § 1982 contains none of the exemptions that
Congress included in the Civil Rights Act of 1968, it would be a serious mistake to suppose
that § 1982 in any way diminishes the significance of the [Open Housing Act]." Id. at 413-
16 (citation omitted). The Court then cited the 1968 Act's saving clause and concluded that
the 1968 Act "had no effect upon § 1982." Id. at 416-17 n.20 (citations omitted).
97. 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976) (now provides a
180-day period for filing a complaint).
98. Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d at 503.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 504.
102. It is the rule that the "intention of the legislature to repeal a statute must be clear
and manifest, and it is not sufficient to establish that a subsequent law covers some of all of
the cases provided for by the prior act." In re Brown, 329 F. Supp. 422, 426 (S.D. Iowa
1971).
103. Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 313, 316-17 (W.D.N.C.
1982), Kemerer v. Davis, 520 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
104. Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 378, 386 (E.D. Va. 1979), rev'don other
grounds, 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
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The Wright court, however, failed to address the relevant and, in-
deed, determinative question: had it known the scope of the 1866 Act,
would the Congress that enacted the 1964 legislation have modified the
earlier sweeping civil rights statute by restricting its provisions to paral-
lel those then under review? The courts in the implied repeal cases
have, without discussion, answered yes.105 This response is erroneous.
These courts have been unable "to see the forest for the trees." As one
commentator imaginatively answered the question:
The proper inquiry should be whether, and in what form, Congress
would have enacted Title VIZ. The enactment of Title VII was the
culmination of many years of strenuous efforts by civil rights forces,
both within Congress and without. . . . Congressional civil rights
advocates, who had fought a long battle to enact legislation to ame-
liorate the condition of the black workingman, would not likely sur-
render such a potentially potent weapon as section 1981 in exchange
for Title VII, whose [sic] broader scope is more than offset by its
complicated procedure and almost total lack of enforcement provi-
sion. Had Congress been aware of the existence of a section 1981
action, necessary votes could probably not have been mustered to
repeal or modify that statute.1°6
It cannot be implied that Congress would have modified section 1981
to conform exactly to the 1964 Act. Kemerer and Hudson were thus
wrongly decided. 10
7
An additional obstacle perceived by the Kemerer and Hudson
courts to maintaining employment discrimination suits against private
clubs under section 1981 is a passage from Justice Stevens' majority
opinion in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer.108 There, the
Supreme Court held that the Transit Authority's blanket exclusion of
methadone users from employment did not violate title VII, section
1981, or the equal protection clause.109 After berating the court of ap-
peals for failing to address the statutory issues before addressing the
constitutional claim (indeed, for failing even to review the district
court's finding of liability under title VII), Justice Stevens stated that
105. See supra note 64 & accompanying text.
106. Comment, Is Section 1981 Mod~fed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?,
1970 DUKE L.J. 1223, 1235 (emphasis in original).
107. I do not suggest that the courts that read title II's private club exemption clause into
the 1866 Act by implication have necessarily reached the wrong result. See Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U.S. 160, 187 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (some contracts may not be man-
dated under the 1866 Civil Rights Act not because of an implied repeal of its provisions but
because "some contracts are so personal 'as to have a discernible rule of exclusivity which is
inoffensive to § 1981' ") (citation omitted).
108. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
109. Id. at 587, 593.
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the Court would dispose of the title VII claim without a remand."10
Justice Stevens further stated, in a footnote, that the lower court's treat-
ment of the title VII claim disposed of the section 1981 claim without
need to remand. "Although the exact applicability of that provision
has not been decided by this Court, it seems clear that it affords no
greater substantive protection than Title VII.'' I
The Kemerer and Hudson courts' reliance on this language to en-
graft on the statute a requirement that defendants in a section 1981
action be subject to title VII cannot be supported. While Justice Ste-
vens' remark may be a reference to the fact that he does not believe
Congress intended section 1981 to apply to the area of employment
discrimination covered by title VII, 12 it makes little sense to isolate the
statement from its context-the availability of avenues of relief for a
claim of adverse impact on Blacks and Hispanics. Justice Stevens' ac-
knowledgment that the exact applicability of section 1981 was not yet
decided by the Court was not a cryptic reference to the fact that the
implied repeal issue remains an open question; it was simply the ver-
balized recognition that the Court had not decided whether section
1981 required showing of purposeful discrimination. 1 3 Because it had
long been the law that a claim under title VII required no such show-
ing,114 Justice Stevens merely stated that, with respect to claims that a
facially neutral employment practice has a disproportionate impact on
a protected class, section 1981 could afford no greater substantive pro-
tection than title VII and thus treatment of the title VII claim would
also dispose of the section 1981 claim without need to remand.' 15
The Kemerer and Hudson courts' interpretation of the language in
Beazer is unreasonable when placed in context, and produces an unjust
result: immunization of employers with fewer than fifteen employees
from the reach of section 1981 because section 701 also excludes such
entities from title VII's definition of "employer". 1 6 Justice Stevens
could not have intended that this footnote have such a sweeping
meaning.
110. Id. at 579-80.
111. Id. at 583-84 n.24.
112. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvannia, 102 S. Ct. 3141, 3158 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring). See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
113. That question has been answered in the affirmative. See General Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 102 S. Ct. 3141, 3149 (1982).
114. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
115. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 102 S. Ct. 3141, 3158 (1982) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
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The inapplicability of the Beazer decision, however, should not
suggest that the Supreme Court has failed completely to provide gui-
dance in analyzing the relationship between the civil rights statutes. In
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. ,117 the Court held that title II did
not supersede section 1982.118 "[T]he hierarchy of administrative ma-
chinery provided by the 1964 Act is not at war with survival of the
principles embodied in section 1982. There is, moreover, a saving
clause in the 1964 Act as respects any right based on any other Federal
• ..law not inconsistent with that Act."' 19 In Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.,120 the Court held that a complainant's submission to bind-
ing arbitration did not foreclose a subsequent title VII action.' 2 ' The
Court made clear Congress' intent to allow individuals to pursue all
possible remedies under other federal and state statutes. 122 In Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. ,123 the Court held that the filing of a
title VII complaint does not toll the statute of limitations for purposes
of a section 1981 claim. "We generally conclude. . . that the remedies
available under Title VII and under § 1981, although related, and al-
though directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and
independent."' 24 The Court also made clear that the private clubs ex-
empted under section 701(b) of title VII are still subject to suit under
section 1981 of the 1866 Act.' 25 In the final analysis, it is unpersuasive
to maintain that the Supreme Court's description of section 198 1's rela-
tionship to title VII as "independent" can be reconciled with a holding
that the availability of section 1981 is dependent on the defendant's
status under title VII.
117. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
118. Id. at 237.
119. Id. at 237-38 (citations omitted).
120. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
121. Id. at 49.
122. Id. at 48 ("the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to
allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other appli-
cable state and federal statutes").
123. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
124. Id. at 461. The Hudson court actually cited the second sentence of this passage and
then inexplicably ignored its conceptual value and summarily dismissed its precedential
worth, stating that "the Supreme Court in Johnson cannot be fairly said to have directly
decided the issue of whether the bar on suing private clubs in Title VII is also applicable, by
statutory implication, to suits brought under § 1981." Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club,
Inc., 535 F. Supp. 313, 316 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
125. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 459.
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Conclusion
It is true that title VII must be construed liberally.' 26 However,
one need not resort to that rule of construction alone to conclude that
section 708 allows states to require that all employers engage in dis-
crimination-free employment practices.' 27 The purpose of title VII is
to eliminate discrimination in employment on several enumerated ba-
ses. Congressional reluctance to extend this law of antidiscrimination
in employment to private clubs acting as employers is not a purpose of
the statute. It is merely a reluctance to act. That reluctance cannot be
viewed as paramount to the broad purpose of Congress to promote
equal employment opportunity. At best, the reluctance was a reflection
of congressional concern not to legislate in an area possessing constitu-
tional implications. At worst, it is a reflection of legislative pragmatism
written into the statute to avoid difficulties in passing the statute.
Either way, the congressional refusal to extend a federal statute to
include particular entitites is hardly a prohibition of the states doing so.
The control of employers' privilege of employment is traditionally a
state concern. Proscription of a local prerogative requires more than an
exemption embodying congressional shyness. This is particularly true
in the face of a saving clause that dictates that all employers must com-
ply with any and all state laws unless, and only unless, the state law
requires or permits the doing of an act that would be unlawful under
title VII. The broader preemption provision contained in title XI fur-
ther clarifies that Congress did not intend to occupy the field and that
state laws are not invalidated unless they are inconsistent with a pur-
pose or provision of a title of the 1964 Act. Legislating in an area
where Congress merely chose not to is not inconsistent with a purpose
or provision of title VII.
If the effect of title VII was to preempt state laws proscribing pri-
vate clubs' discriminatory employment practices, the very purpose of
title VII-the elimination of discrimination in employment-would be
defeated. To argue that it was the congressional intent to permit dis-
criminatory practices in employment and that it was the purpose of
Congress to preclude the states from proscribing discrimination is to
ascribe to Congress an unlawful and unconstitutional intent and pur-
pose: the promotion of discrimination in employment. If such was
126. Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1980).
127. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01, at 48 (4th ed. 1976)
("'Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of inter-
pretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discus-
sion.' ") (citation and footnote omitted).
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Congress' purpose, it would violate the fifth amendment's due process
clause, and not just the letter and the spirit of title VII.
That Congress did not intend to have its exemption of private
clubs interpreted as a purpose of title VII is also discernible from the
words of the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey quoted at the outset.
Senator Humphrey spoke to the issue in precise language and made it
clear that he was addressing federal legal provisions. It is one thing for
a Senator to argue that federal laws ought not proscribe certain activity;
it is a wholly different-and incorrect-interpretation of Senator
Humphrey's statements to conclude that the Congress intended to pro-
hibit the states from enacting laws more protective of their citizenry's
rights than the federal government was then willing to do.
Further support for this Article's thesis is found in the fact that
Congress itself choose not to exempt private clubs from coverage under
the ADEA of 1967. It would be unkind to submit that Congress was
more or less noble, depending on one's view, concerning the issue of
age than concerning the issues of race, national origin, religion, or sex.
It certainly deflates the import of the issue of the constitutional right of
association, and therefore puts that issue in proper perspective, to rec-
ognize that Congress, barely three years after enacting the 1964 Act,
completely ignored any possible consequences to the associational
rights of private clubs in the ADEA. It makes more persuasive the
explanation that Congress was merely reluctant to extend its title VII
proscriptions to private clubs because of the more volatile nature of
that legislation. It is one thing to not prohibit discrimination, and an-
other to promote discrimination.
The very fact that Congress did not specifically and unequivocally
extend its federal exemption of private clubs to the states is proof be-
yond cavil that Congress did not intend to prohibit the states from do-
ing that which is their established prerogative. Title VII does not
preempt state regulation of private clubs' employment practices.

